Landlordism, tenants and the groundwater sector: Lessons from the Tarai-Madhesh, Nepal:IWMI Research Report 162 by Sugden, Fraser
 
 
Landlordism, tenants and the groundwater sector:
Lessons from the Tarai-Madhesh, Nepal
Sugden, Fraser
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Sugden, F 2014, Landlordism, tenants and the groundwater sector: Lessons from the Tarai-Madhesh, Nepal:
IWMI Research Report 162. International Water Management Institute, Colombo.
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 13. Nov. 2019
IWMI 
Research 
Report Landlordism, Tenants and the 
Groundwater Sector: Lessons 
from Tarai-Madhesh, Nepal
Fraser Sugden
162
Research Reports
The publications in this series cover a wide range of subjects—from computer 
modeling to experience with water user associations—and vary in content from 
directly applicable research to more basic studies, on which applied work ultimately 
depends. Some research reports are narrowly focused, analytical and detailed 
empirical studies; others are wide-ranging and synthetic overviews of generic 
problems.
Although most of the reports are published by IWMI staff and their 
collaborators, we welcome contributions from others. Each report is reviewed 
internally by IWMI staff, and by external reviewers. The reports are published and 
distributed both in hard copy and electronically (www.iwmi.org) and where possible 
all data and analyses will be available as separate downloadable files. Reports 
may be copied freely and cited with due acknowledgment.
About IWMI
IWMI’s mission is to provide evidence-based solutions to sustainably manage water 
and land resources for food security, people’s livelihoods and the environment. 
IWMI works in partnership with governments, civil society and the private sector 
to develop scalable agricultural water management solutions that have a tangible 
impact on poverty reduction, food security and ecosystem health.
iInternational Water Management Institute (IWMI) 
P O Box 2075, Colombo, Sri Lanka
IWMI Research Report 162
Landlordism, Tenants and the Groundwater 
Sector: Lessons from Tarai-Madhesh, Nepal
Fraser Sugden
The author: Fraser Sugden is a Researcher - Social Science at the International Water Management 
Institute (IWMI), Kathmandu, Nepal.
Sugden, F. 2014. Landlordism, tenants and the groundwater sector: lessons from Tarai-Madhesh, Nepal. 
Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute (IWMI). 33p. (IWMI Research Report 162). 
doi: 10.5337/2015.204
/ land ownership / land tenure / land reform / tenant's rights / groundwater irrigation / water use / water 
market / political aspects / tube well irrigation / pumping / farmers / cultivators / households / investment / 
costs / incentives / Nepal /
ISSN 1026-0862 
ISBN 978-92-9090-814-2
Copyright © 2014, by IWMI. All rights reserved. IWMI encourages the use of its material provided that the 
organization is acknowledged and kept informed in all such instances.
Front cover photograph shows a shallow tube well and diesel pump in the wheat fields of Bhaudaha, Morang 
District, Nepal (photo: Fraser Sugden).
Please send inquiries and comments to IWMI-Publications@cgiar.org
A free copy of this publication can be downloaded at
www.iwmi.org/Publications/IWMI_Research_Reports/index.aspx
Acknowledgements
The author is extremely grateful to Upendra Khawas (consultant), Ashok Rai (International Maize and 
Wheat Improvement Center [CIMMYT]) and Niki Maskey-Amatya (IWMI) for their invaluable support 
during fieldwork; and to Mina Devkota (International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center [CIMMYT]), 
Lalita Sah (Rural Self-Reliance Development Centre [RSDC]) and Mathura Yadav (Nepal Agricultural 
Research Council [NARC]), who accompanied us to the field and arranged meetings and focus group 
discussions. The author would also like to extend his thanks to the residents of Jhorahat village 
development committee (VDC) for their kind logistical support and hospitality during the research in 
Morang, in particular, Bijay Chaudhary, and are grateful for the assistance of Yaman Sardar and Sanju 
Sardar in arranging meetings with farmers in the field.
Donors
This research study was funded by the following:
 This work was undertaken as part of the CGIAR Research  
 Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security  
 (CCAFS), which is a strategic partnership of CGIAR and  
 Future Earth. 
  CGIAR is a global research partnership for a food- 
 secure future. The views expressed in this document cannot  
 be taken to reflect the official opinions of CGIAR or Future  
 Earth.

vv
Contents
Summary  vii
Introduction  1
Background  2
Methods  3
Existing Shallow Tube Well Programs in Three Districts 5
The Evolution of Semi-feudal Agrarian Relations in the Tarai-Madhesh 6
 Early Land Relations 6
 The Extent of the Problem: District-level Data 9
Landlord-tenant Relations and Groundwater Development 11
 Purchase of Shallow Tube Wells and Equity 11
 The Groundwater and Equipment Rental Market 16
 Collective Use of Groundwater 21
Conclusions and Recommendations 23
References 26

vii
Summary
Over recent decades, there has been a shift 
in the focus of government irrigation schemes 
towards groundwater development throughout the 
Gangetic Plains, especially in the Nepal Tarai-
Madhesh. Unlike many other forms of irrigation, 
in groundwater irrigation, a person’s capacity to 
irrigate is intricately connected to their ability to 
invest in pumping equipment and the boring of 
wells. This is particularly significant given the 
deeply entrenched inequalities in landownership 
in the region. A significant gap in the literature 
is the role of landlord-tenant relations in shaping 
groundwater use. A significant portion of the rural 
population in the Nepal Tarai farm as tenants for 
both absentee and local landlords, a legacy of 
the centralized feudalism of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. This report explores 
the impact of landlord-tenant relations on access 
to groundwater irrigation through both direct 
investment and the groundwater market. It is 
shown that tenant farmers have a reduced 
incentive to invest in tube wells due to insecure 
tenure and high rent payments, while landlords 
themselves have been shown to offer little 
support. One option is to rent tube wells or pumps. 
However, the costs and incentives to rent wells or 
equipment are high due to monopolistic markets 
and high diesel prices. While the contribution from 
landlords could increase incentives for investment, 
this is rarely the case, particularly if landlords 
are absentee. Furthermore, water is not always 
available when required. The collective ownership 
of wells offers a new set of options for tenant 
farmers, but it presents its own set of challenges. 
These include the continued barriers to renting 
pumping equipment, the need for landownership 
or tenancy papers to be part of a user committee, 
and capture of land by elite and wealthy farmers. 
In sum, i t  is crucial that pol icymakers 
a re  aware  o f  t he  cha l l enges  posed  by 
landlordism today in the Tarai and elsewhere 
in the Gangetic Plains, and remain engaged 
in debates over land reform. There are also a 
number of initiatives which could facilitate more 
equitable access to groundwater for tenants. 
These include allowing tenants without legal 
papers to apply for groundwater irrigation, 
systems for collective ownership of equipment, 
and greater targeting of programs and policies 
towards the tenant farmer class.

1Landlordism, Tenants and the Groundwater Sector: 
Lessons from Tarai-Madhesh, Nepal 
Fraser Sugden
Introduction
Over the last decade, government development 
agencies across the Indo-Gangetic Plains have 
been shifting their focus towards the expansion of 
groundwater irrigation, particularly through shallow 
tube wells. In Nepal, this has arisen particularly as 
a result of the escalating costs, and concerns over 
the environmental and economic sustainability of 
large-scale surface irrigation schemes (Bhandari 
and Pandey 2006). Across South Asia, the 
expansion of groundwater use through shallow 
tube wells is argued to facilitate a decentralization 
of the provision of irrigation and it has allowed 
farmers to access water ‘on demand’, even in 
areas well beyond the command of conventional 
surface schemes (Shah 2006, 2007a). At the 
same time, it has been crucial in reducing 
vulnerability to drought and monsoon failures, 
and has facilitated an intensification of agriculture. 
While over-extraction of groundwater and declining 
volumes of aquifers remains a challenge across 
the Indo-Gangetic Plains, there are still areas 
where groundwater availability remains high and 
the potential has been underutilized, including the 
Nepal Tarai (Shah 2007a).  
The focus of this report is not, however, to 
investigate issues of whether groundwater from 
shallow tube wells is available, but to look at the 
issue of groundwater access. There is some well-
established scholarship on groundwater access 
issues in the eastern Indo-Gangetic Plains. 
Studies by Shah (2006, 2007b) have addressed 
the critical dilemma of rural energy supply for 
pumping, which is a challenge across the eastern 
Indo-Gangetic Plains in the context of diesel price 
rises. Research by Mukherji (2007) has explored 
the institutional constraints (and opportunities) in 
accessing the groundwater market, such as the 
need for familial ties to pump owners. Kishore 
(2004) focused on the poor terms of trade for 
farmers in Bihar which discourages expenditure 
on prohibitively high diesel pumping, not to 
mention the stagnant levels of public investment 
in infrastructure and weak supporting services. 
This report ,  however, seeks to better 
understand the constraints to the expansion of 
groundwater irrigation rooted in the agrarian 
structure itself. It is acknowledged in the literature 
that investment in shallow tube wells and pumping 
equipment in the eastern Indo-Gangetic Plains 
is out of reach for marginal producers, and they 
face similar financial barriers to ‘purchasing’ 
groundwater (Kishore 2004; Mukherji 2007; 
Mukherji et al. 2003). This is important as 
constraints linked to household economic status 
are higher for groundwater use than they are 
for accessing water from gravity fed sources, 
as groundwater generally requires significant 
monetary investment for the well and pumping 
equipment. 
However, it is necessary to dig deeper to 
understand the production relations which lie 
behind these constraints and, in particular, the 
differences within the ‘marginal’ farmer group with 
respect to land tenure and their relation with other 
farmers. In Nepal, particularly in large parts of the 
plains, the farming populations are differentiated 
between those owning and cultivating most of 
their land, and those cultivating mostly as tenants. 
Aside from relations of surplus appropriation 
between farmers, whereby large farmers extract 
high rents, unequal class relations are also 
present between tenant farmers and urban-
based landlords (Sugden and Gurung 2012). 
In the semi-feudal economic formation of the 
Eastern Gangetic Plains, where rent payments 
even eat into household subsistence needs (see 
2Bhaduri 1973; Sugden 2013), one’s position in 
this complex web of landlord-tenant relations has 
a critical role in determining investment in, and 
access to, groundwater irrigation. It has been 
argued earlier that technocratic reforms will by no 
means undermine semi-feudalism in Nepal, which 
is reproduced on a political and economic level at 
multiple scales (Sugden 2013). Nevertheless, by 
better understanding the complexities of landlord-
tenant relations, one can develop short-term 
solutions which can strengthen the livelihoods 
and food security within the base of the agrarian 
structure.
This research report, therefore, seeks to 
identify the constraints and potential solutions 
faced by tenant farmers, in particular, in accessing 
groundwater. This includes the barriers they face 
in investing in groundwater technology or wells, as 
well as in accessing groundwater through water 
markets or cooperative formations. 
Background
The Tarai or Madhesh of southern Nepal is a 
plains region with vast groundwater reserves, 
but comparatively limited expansion of shallow 
or deep tube wells. While the northern belt, the 
bhabar, is a forested alluvial slope of course 
gravels at the foot of the Churia range (the 
first Himalayan foothills), the plains tract further 
south is one of the most important agricultural-
producing areas in Nepal where most of the 
lowland population resides. It is a region of 
significant cultural diversity with a sizeable adivasi 
(indigenous) population who resided in the 
formerly forested regions, and a large population 
of Maithi l i ,  Bhojpuri and Avadhi speaking 
communities with their own complex caste system 
who populate both sides of the Nepal-India 
border. Finally, there is a large population of 
settlers from the hills who have migrated to the 
Tarai over the last 60 years, particularly in the 
northern belt (Gaige 1976).
The Tarai faces considerable challenges 
to meet the subsistence needs of both its own 
population, and contribute to food security at 
a national level. The population of the region 
continues to grow with migration from the 
hills. While it was home to 48.4% of Nepal’s 
population in the 2001 census, it had increased 
to 50.2% by 2011 (Central Bureau of Statistics 
2012). Migration takes place to urban as well 
as rural areas, and the expansion of towns 
will put further pressure on the availability of 
land for cultivation (Pant 2011). Meanwhile, 
in villages, the continued fragmentation of 
holdings and climate change is reducing food 
output at a household level. In this context, the 
dissemination of shallow tube well irrigation 
technologies is crucial to develop the productive 
forces and improve food security.
While groundwater extraction schemes using 
shallow tube wells had begun in the 1960s 
in the Tarai-Madhesh, larger-scale initiatives 
began in 1975 with the establishment of the 
Nepal Groundwater Resources Development 
Board (GWRDB) in 1976 (GWRDB 2012). 
They were responsible for assessing the 
areas of groundwater potential in the Tarai 
through geophysical surveys of aquifers, and 
the monitoring of sets of existing tube wells for 
changes in water levels and reserves. 
As of 2006/2007, it is estimated that 726,000 
hectares (ha) of land in the Tarai had good 
potential for shallow aquifer development and 
305,000 ha with marginal potential (GWRDB 
2012), with around 3,000 shallow tube well units 
being installed each year (Bhandari and Pandey 
2006). However, while the Tarai-Madhesh is 
at the forefront of groundwater development in 
Nepal, the combination of a deeply entrenched 
caste system and a complex history of settlement 
make it a region with a highly stratified social 
3structure. It, therefore, makes it an ideal case 
study to explore the impact of landlord-tenant 
relations on groundwater uptake. This report 
sheds light on the dynamics of shallow tube well 
use under semi-feudal conditions, with a focus 
on three districts in the western, central and 
eastern Tarai, namely Rupandehi, Dhanusha and 
Morang.
Methods
There are three main sources of data for this 
report. The first is analysis of secondary data, in 
particular, the Nepal National Sample Census of 
Agriculture. The second is data from a series of 
previous and ongoing studies in the eastern Tarai 
by the author, in particular, a detailed one and 
a half-year study of agrarian relations in Morang 
District in 2007-2008. The third source of data 
is 36 interviews and focus group discussions 
conducted during field visits to Morang, Dhanusha 
and Rupandehi districts between April and 
August 2012. Interviews were unstructured, 
and focused specifically on the dynamics of 
landlord-tenant relations and the different options 
for accessing groundwater, based on a set of 
key themes. Interviews were carried out with 
farmers from different socioeconomic groups, 
although the focus was on more marginal and 
tenant farmers. While it was originally planned 
to conduct separate interviews and focus group 
discussions, the difficulties controlling space within 
the community meant that individual household 
interviews often developed into focus group 
discussions as onlookers joined in. Finally, a 
quantitative survey was carried out in the same 
VDCs1 of Dhanusha and Morang as part of a 
separate IWMI study on the vulnerability to climate 
change, which was also integrated into this report 
to provide insights into tube well ownership and 
use by tenant farmers. This survey was carried 
out in Ekrahi and Thadi Jijha VDCs of Dhanusha, 
and Jhorahat, Bhaudaha and Thalaha VDCs of 
Morang.
As groundwater use amongst marginal and 
tenant farmers is still so limited, there was 
insufficient data from single villages to generate 
an overview of the diversity of issues2. Therefore, 
an attempt was made to cover a wide range 
of villages3 across the south of each district – 
the region which traditionally has the highest 
levels of landlessness, as opposed to the more 
prosperous northern belts where much of the 
land is farmed by settlers from the hills with larger 
owner-cultivated holdings. The list of interviews 
conducted is displayed in Table 1, while their 
location is displayed in Figure 1. This list is by 
no means exhaustive as it is excludes numerous 
informal interactions and conversations which took 
place in public locations, such as tea shops and 
village resting places.
1 Village Development Committee (VDC) is the local unit of governance.
2 In many villages, the number of operational tube wells was in single figures, making it difficult to generate broad conclusions.
3 Villages were selected according to the availability of local gatekeepers, while maintaining a geographical spread.
4TABLE 1. Number of interviews/focus group discussions per VDC. 
VDC District Number of interviews/focus group discussions
Bhaudaha Morang 6
Sisabani Jahada Morang 1
Baijnathpur Morang 2
Kadmaha Morang 2
Katahari Morang 1
Dainiya Morang 2
Giddha Dhanusha 3
Ekrahi Dhanusha 2
Phulgama Dhanusha 1
Singhyahi Madan Dhanusha 3
Dhabouli Dhanusha 1
Godhegas Dhanusha 2
Bangaha Mahottari (bordering Dhanusha) 2
Lumbini Rupandehi 3
Basantpur Rupandehi 2
Chhipagad Rupandehi 2
Hakui Nawalparasi (bordering Rupandehi) 1
Total  36
FIGURE 1. Map of field sites and location within Nepal.
5conducted at Groundwater Development Office, 
Jaleshwor and Biratnagar)5. 
Another ongoing project restricted to the 
eastern and central Tarai is the Deep Tube 
Well/Shallow Tube Well Irrigation project. The 
shallow tube well component was launched in 
2007/2008 with support from India, beginning 
initially in Mahottari and Dhanusha, and later 
being expanded to other districts. At present, the 
government provides five wells for each 20 bighas 
(13.3 ha) of land area for free to interested user 
groups. In Morang, for example, it had covered 22 
VDCs in the 2011/2012 financial year, installing 
382 shallow tube wells (interview conducted at 
Groundwater Resources Development Board 
Office, Biratnagar).
A now discontinued project, which ran in 
parallel to the above-mentioned projects, was the 
Community Groundwater Irrigation Sector Project 
(CGISP) funded by the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), which was established in 1997/1998 
and focused on the central and eastern Tarai, 
including Dhanusha and Morang. It established 
user groups of up to four people for a 5 bigha (3.3 
ha) command area, offering collateral free loans 
to groups. This was an integrated project, which 
also provided 2,800 m of road for each of the five 
tube wells installed in a VDC, while being linked 
to existing extension programs of the district 
agricultural offices. 
One of  the f i rst  large-scale groundwater 
projects in the eastern and central Tarai, which 
encompasses Dhanusha and Morang districts, 
was the Community Shallow Tube well Irrigation 
Project (CSTIP) funded by the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD) between 
1994/1995 and 2000. Through easing access to 
tube well irrigation, it provided irrigation facilities 
for 4,855 ha of land in Sunsari, Saptari, Siraha, 
Sarlahi and Rautahat. In Rupandehi in the west, 
a number of government programs have been in 
place from the 1980s onwards under the support 
of the GWRDB. These include the Bhairawa-
Lumbini Groundwater Project focusing on deep 
tube well irrigation, and the Nepal Irrigation Sector 
Project focusing on shallow as well as deep tube 
wells, both of which have been discontinued. 
One of the first major projects in recent years 
which included all three districts was the APP 
Shallow Tube Well Program, linked to the targets 
of the 1996-2016 Agriculture Perspective Plan 
(APP), which placed considerable emphasis on 
promoting shallow tube well irrigation as part of 
its Tarai strategy (APROSC 1995). It established 
groundwater user groups, each with a minimum of 
three farmers, jointly cultivating a land area of at 
least 4 bighas4 (2.68 ha). Under the current phase 
of the project, however, farmers are provided 
the well, while purchasing the pump set remains 
the responsibility of the user group (interviews 
4 Bigha is the most commonly used unit for land area. 1 bigha = 0.67 hectares.
5 There is also an associated APP Deep Tube Well project, although the focus now is on shallow tube wells. The deep tube wells irrigate a 
larger command area of up to 40 bighas, but they are considerably more expensive given their greater depth of more than 100 m.
Existing Shallow Tube Well Programs in Three Districts
6The Evolution of Semi-feudal Agrarian Relations in the Tarai-
Madhesh
The most important ruling was the 1964 Land 
Related Act (Regmi 1976). The Act introduced 
ceilings on landholdings and sought to redistribute 
surplus land. A family was permitted to own no 
more than 25 bighas (16.75 ha) of agricultural 
land in the Tarai (inclusive of prescribed areas for 
residential purposes), while tenants were entitled 
to a maximum of 4 bighas (2.68 ha) for cultivation 
only (Sugden and Gurung 2012). Lands in excess 
were acquired by the government after payment 
of compensation, and surplus land was to be 
redistributed to the tenants or landless people 
(Regmi 1976). The Act also set agricultural rents 
at a maximum of 50% of the crop and made 
efforts to introduce formal tenancy rights (Adhikari 
2006; Regmi 1976). Tenants were entitled to 
permanent tenancy rights on the agricultural land 
farmed by them and eviction was permitted only if 
they discontinued cultivation for more than a year, 
did anything to reduce the value or productivity of 
the land, or defaulted on rent payments.
The government had reportedly acquired 
approximately 50,000 ha of land by 1972. 
However ,  Regmi  (1976)  no ted tha t  th is 
represented only 3% of the cultivable area and it 
was estimated that only 22,000 ha were actually 
redistributed, benefiting just 10,000 farmers. 
Despite the stated objectives, the 1964 Land Act 
and its subsequent amendments into the 1970s 
failed to create real changes in agrarian relations. 
Ceilings were weakly enforced, little land was 
redistributed and landlords rather than tenants 
often gained from the new rules (Alden-Wily et 
al. 2008). The program was not fully implemented 
due to a lack of cooperation between government 
departments, and a lack of clarity in administrative 
and bureaucratic practices, not to mention 
resistance by politically powerful landowners. 
Landlords were frequently able to avoid reforms 
using their political connections or deception to 
retain ownership of their holdings (Adhikari 2006, 
2011; Alden-Wily et al. 2008; Deuja 2008). Joshi 
and Mason (2007, 404) estimated that, after the 
reforms of the 1960s, 3.3% of households in 
Early Land Relations
Before understanding the impact of tenancy on 
the success of groundwater development, it is 
useful to trace the origins of the present agrarian 
structure. The landownership structure in southern 
Morang, Dhanusha and Rupandehi is highly 
unequal, with a large population of marginal-owner 
cultivators and tenants at the base of the agrarian 
structure. Semi-feudal relations emerged from 
the era when the Tarai was first annexed by the 
Gorkhali regime, and the Shah and then Rana 
rulers distributed land grants to elites from the hills 
(Regmi 1976). Forested land was cleared by these 
settlers, particularly in Rupandehi and Morang, and 
indigenous communities, many of whom had once 
followed forest-based livelihoods, became tenants 
on these new birta estates which operated as 
semi-independent feudal vassals (Sugden 2013). 
At the same time, on the remaining lands, the new 
rulers gave tax collection responsibilities to elites 
from within the indigenous, Muslim and Hindu caste 
population of the plains, as well to nobles from 
the hills and even India. Functionaries were also 
encouraged to clear new estates in the forest and 
bring in cultivators from both the local population 
and from India. Throughout the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century these functionaries and 
land grant recipients emerged into two powerful, 
landowning classes (Regmi 1976, 1978; Sugden 
2013). 
Land Reforms
Following the overthrow of the Rana regime in 
1950, there was a wave of land reforms under 
the short-lived multi-party government. Given the 
importance of agriculture in Nepal and the failure 
of agriculture to meet the needs of the population, 
reforms were seen as a first step to improve the 
conditions of the peasantry and it became an 
important political agenda (Alden-Wily et al. 2008; 
Regmi 1976). Reforms were continued under the 
partly-less Panchayat system from the 1960s to 
1980s. 
7Nepal still owned around 26.9% of arable land, 
while 62% of peasant households owned only 
49% of the land in the country. 
Given landlord-friendly rental legislations, 
which still entitled the landowner to half of the 
produce, land remained a profitable source of 
investment even following the land reforms. 
Growing prosperity in urban centers encouraged 
the purchases of land by town dwellers between 
the 1970s and 1990s6.  In 1997, a fourth 
amendment to the 1964 Land Act eliminated dual 
ownership by offering registered tenants the right 
to 50% of the owners’ land that they cultivate. 
Landlords, however, remained very reluctant to 
offer tenants official papers, while the government 
made few efforts to enforce these provisions 
(Alden-Wily et al. 2008). 
The 2001 amendment to the Land Act further 
reduced the ceilings on landownership fixed in 
1964, particularly given the pressure placed on 
the government by the People’s War led by the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (Joshi and 
Mason 2007). The amendment, once again, 
sought to regulate rents, although they remained 
at 50% of the main crop, while the provision 
entitling long-term tenants to half of the holdings 
was reiterated (Alden-Wily et al. 2008). However, 
due to pressure from opposition parties, the 
revised ceilings were not implemented (Nepali 
and Pyakuryal 2008). Similarly, regulation of 
rents were ineffective given that a large number 
of tenants remained unregistered, allowing 
landlords to effectively charge what they wished. 
According to the Nepal Population Census of 
2001, 29.7% of households across Nepal were 
renting land or housing. However, this was three 
times the proportion of officially registered tenants, 
including those in urban areas, suggesting that the 
proportion of registered agricultural tenants would 
be even lower (Alden-Wily et al. 2008, 59).  
When dealing with land officials, landlords 
have frequently denied there are tenants on their 
land, evicted them or classified them as farm 
laborers by ‘hiring’ them on a seasonal basis 
(Alden-Wily et al. 2008). Lack of tenancy rights 
also prevents farmers from ‘claiming’ their share 
of the land after a set period of time. Alden Wily 
et al. (2008) reported that landlords often change 
tenants every few years, a process which is also 
going to reduce the likelihood that tenants will try 
to claim a share of the land.  
The 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) at the end of the People’s War placed 
considerable emphasis on the need for significant 
land reforms (Alden-Wily et al. 2008), and it also 
figured in the Three Year Plan Approach Paper 
(2010-2013), which discusses the priority areas 
most relevant to Nepal’s development (National 
Planning Commission 2010). Nevertheless, there 
has still been little progress in developing a 
concrete proposal, let alone implementing land 
reforms, and the long-established link between 
landownership and political power is likely to 
pose as a significant constraint to implementation 
today as it had in the 1960s (Sugden and Gurung 
2012).
Absentee and Local Landlordism
Independent of these largely non-effective land 
reform legislations, two distinct patterns of change 
in landlord-tenant relations have emerged within 
the three districts over the last few decades. The 
first trajectory is evident in the regions with large 
adivasi (indigenous) populations (large parts 
of Morang and Rupandehi), and the second is 
present in the regions with a Maithili- or Bhojpuri-
speaking Hindu caste majority (much of Dhanusha 
and western Rupandehi).
In the first domain, there has been a decline 
in the local landlord class over the last few 
decades, particularly with regards to those from 
the adivasi Tharu community, a topic covered 
in several recent papers, and the rise of an 
absentee landlord class (Sugden 2013; Sugden 
and Gurung 2012). Southern Morang and 
southwestern Rupandehi have high adivasi 
populations. In Madhuri and Birini in Rupandehi, 
interviews with elders revealed that some Tharu 
families who had 20-30 bighas (13-20 ha) in 
6 Regmi (1976) termed this change as the rise of a ‘non-ascriptive’ landowning class, who were now sharing control over land resources with 
the traditional landed elite which over the generations had held ‘ascriptive’ rights to land. See Sugden and Gurung (2012) for more on this topic.
8their name, had sold their land over the last 20 
years due to indebtedness. Similar stories have 
been documented from Morang District, whereby 
Tharu and Rajbanshi landlords, who were once 
important tax collectors, had lost their political 
and economic power which was rooted in the 
now obsolete Rana agrarian bureaucracy (Sugden 
2013). Many had sold land to politically connected 
urban dwellers due to indebtedness in the 
context of an increasingly monetized economy. 
The remaining holdings were reduced due to 
fragmentation amongst sons. A large number of 
smaller landholding peasants also sold or had 
land confiscated due to indebtedness to money 
lenders in cities, as well as outright deception. 
Many of the growing absentee landlord class 
were the descendants of the more powerful 
administrators from the Rana period and Birta 
recipients who had avoided the land reforms. This 
group was mostly from the high castes in the hills, 
who had now migrated to urban centers and were 
working in the bureaucracy or other professional 
sectors. However, some landlords were also from 
a new class of urban landlords buying plots for 
speculative purposes, as well as for the additional 
income that can be gained from rent (Sugden 
2013). The descendants of both types of landlord 
retain their estates in the countryside, yet often 
have only a limited interest in agriculture.
A consequence is that, within the adivasi 
belt of central and southeastern Rupandehi and 
southern Morang, there are entire villages that are 
home to indigenous cultivators, where a majority 
of the households are working as tenants for 
absentee landlords. The 2013 survey in Morang 
revealed that 73% of land in the sample was 
under tenancy. Across all three VDCs, tenants, 
part-tenants and landless laborers represent 
69% of the sample, while most of the remainder 
were owner cultivators. Large owner cultivators 
with more than 3 bighas (2 ha) of land are small 
in number, at just 4% of the sample, as the 
main landlord class is absentee and thus is not 
included in the sample (see Table 2). Of the 
rented land in the sample, three-quarters belong 
to absentee landlords.  
In Rupandehi, there was no survey data 
available for the study villages, yet estimates 
given during a focus group discussion suggested 
that 70% of households in Birini and 71% 
in Mahuwari operate at least some of their 
land as tenants, again, mostly for absentee 
landlords with estates ranging from 5 to 20 bighas 
(approximately 3 to 13 ha).
Within the second cultural domain where 
people from the Hindu caste are predominant, the 
pattern of change has been somewhat different. In 
Dhanusha and parts of western Rupandehi, oral 
histories suggest there was a less pronounced 
shift in the landownership structure since the end 
of the Rana era. Powerful households from the 
local upper and middle castes7 held administrative 
positions under the Ranas, and continue to be 
important landowners today, with lower caste 
counterparts working for them as tenants or 
laborers. However, many of the more powerful 
landlords who had held high administrative roles 
had migrated to urban centers. Since the 1990s, 
many have been selling a lot of their land as it is 
deemed to hold little speculative value given the 
relative remoteness of these regions, and thus 
the absentee landlord class declined. This was 
intensified in the political instability following the 
beginning of the People’s War in 1996. 
TABLE 2. Comparing samples from selected communities in Morang and Dhanusha.
District Part tenants  Pure Landless Owner Owner Owner Non- 
 (%) tenants  laborers  cultivators cultivators  cultivators cultivator 
  (%) (%) with > 0.5 ha with < 0.5-2 ha with < 2 ha  with land 
    (%)  (%)  (%)  (%)
Dhanusha (2 VDCs) 23 3 15 26 20 9 4
Morang (3 VDCs) 23 16 30 12 13 2 4
7 Upper castes include the Brahmins, and middle castes include the Teli or Yadav. 
9Therefore, in western Rupandehi and 
Dhanusha, the landlord class is smaller, yet 
inequality remains high at a local level. A survey 
carried out in 2013 in two VDCs of Dhanusha, 
Ekrahi (included in this study) and Thadi Jijha 
(as part of a separate study), showed that 
the largest owner cultivators with more than 3 
bighas (2 ha) represent only 9% of the total 
sample (see Table 2), yet they own 31% of the 
cultivated land. Two-thirds of this group were 
from the dominant middle and high castes. Of 
the sampled households, 36% were marginal 
owner cultivators with less than 1 bigha (0.67 
ha), 24% were tenants or part tenants, and 11% 
were landless laborers. In Mahuwari in western 
Rupandehi, there was no survey data available, 
yet a signif icant 71% of households were 
estimated to be part tenants, with around 6% as 
pure tenants. Most land was reportedly rented 
from local large farmers, who had maximum 
holdings of up to 10 bighas (6 ha).
In sum, it appears that, in the communities 
where data was collected in southern Dhanusha 
and western Rupandehi, the landlords are mostly 
from the local dominant castes. The landholding 
size is not as large as their absentee counterparts, 
yet they still control a significant portion of the 
land in each village. In the study sites in southern 
Morang and parts of eastern Rupandehi, on the 
other hand, most of the big landlords are absentee 
urban dwellers, and often hold much larger estates. 
It is also worth noting that, in all communities, rents 
are almost always paid in kind as a portion of the 
harvest. However, a fixed-rate rent is becoming 
more common in the regions with absentee 
landlordism, as it requires less supervision by the 
landlord, and sharecropping remains prevalent in 
areas where landlords are local. These findings 
are echoed in the study carried out by Shah et al. 
(2009) in India.
The Extent of the Problem: District-level 
Data
It is worth noting that the levels of tenancy and 
landlessness are not present across all of the 
three districts. The northern belt across the 
Tarai is home to wealthier owner cultivators who 
migrated from the hills, and in Rupandehi and 
Morang, they represent a significant portion of 
the population. Therefore, district-wise data show 
lower overall levels of tenancy, particularly in 
Rupandehi (Figure 2). Nevertheless, landlord-
FIGURE 2. Percentage of landless people and those engaged in tenancy in each of the three study districts.  
Data sources: Landless people (census 2001); those engaged in tenancy (NSCA 2001/2002).
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tenant relations are still widespread enough 
to be of considerable relevance to agrarian 
development. In Morang, a substantial 40% 
of households were shown to have no land in 
the 2001 census8, while the National Sample 
Census of Agriculture (NSCA) from 2001/20029 
recorded that 32% of the respondents rent some 
land either as pure or part tenants. In Dhanusha, 
the census records 29% landlessness, while 
the NSCA records that 25% of households are 
engaged in tenancy. 
From the 2001/2002 NSCA, it is clear that 
across all three districts, the majority of owner 
cultivators are also marginal. In Morang, 39% of 
owner cultivators have landholdings of less than 
0.5 ha, while this is 43% in Rupandehi (Figure 
3). In Dhanusha, where there appears to be the 
greatest local-level inequality (local rather than 
absentee landlords), a substantial 50% of owner 
cultivators own less than 0.5 ha. Many of these 
small owner cultivators also rent part of their 
holdings.
I n  a l l  t h r e e  d i s t r i c t s ,  t h e r e  i s  a l s o 
considerable concentration of landholdings, 
although, again, this is highest in Dhanusha 
where 28% of the cultivated land is owned by 
just 5% of farmers operating holdings greater 
than 3 ha (Figure 4). Accepting that this data 
is more than a decade old, data collected 
locally suggested that large farmers nowadays 
increasingly prefer to give their excess land to 
tenants rather than cultivating it themselves. 
With the high cost of inputs and the increased 
risks posed by climate change, giving out land 
to poorer farmers on share tenancies is often 
preferred by large farmers. In this way, some 
of the costs, and thus the risks, are shared with 
the tenant, and their household capital and labor 
8 Data on household landownership was not included in the 2011 census.
9 Results from the 2010/2011 survey are not yet available.
FIGURE 3. Proportion of land cultivated by different farm size categories.
         
Data source: NSCA (2001).
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can be allocated to other sectors. This suggests 
that landlord-tenant relations may increase in the 
years to come. This corroborates the findings 
of Shah et al. (2009) from India, which suggest 
that rising costs of production are making 
independent cultivation less viable for many 
households, and is one factor driving an increase 
in tenancy.
The extent of landlord-tenant relations and 
the different forms it takes has implications for 
groundwater development, as this report will go 
on to show.
FIGURE 4. Proportion of land cultivated by different farm size categories.
Data source: NSCA (2001).
Landlord-tenant Relations and Groundwater Development
Purchase of Shallow Tube Wells and 
Equity
Having established that land inequality and 
landlord-tenant relations are a significant issue, 
how does this affect the uptake of the shallow 
tube well technology? There are three primary 
ways in which groundwater is utilized by farmers 
in Morang, Dhanusha and Rupandehi districts. 
First, a household can bore their own shallow 
tube well and purchase a pump set. Second, they 
can rent a well from other farmers. Similarly, if 
they own a well but no pump set, they can rent 
the pump. Third, tube wells and pump sets can be 
purchased collectively and water can be shared 
through a user group. 
To begin an analysis of equity issues, it 
is useful to look at the distributional benefits 
of groundwater use. Unlike large-scale public 
irrigation systems, shallow tube well investment 
is the domain of atomized units of production, 
essent ia l ly  the fami ly farm (Shah 2006). 
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Consequently, the position of each household in 
the landownership structure has a critical impact 
on investment capacity. Expenditure on equipment 
and wells are by no means scale neutral. The 
2001/2002 NSCA sample provides some insights 
into the influence of farm size on the type of 
irrigation used. Unfortunately, this data does not 
differentiate between households that operate land 
as tenants and those that are owner cultivators. 
Nevertheless, given that most rented plots were 
found to be less than 1.5 bighas (1 ha), and 
that many marginal farmers are also tenants, it 
remains a useful approximate measure.
As one would expect, the 2001/2002 NSCA 
data suggests that private ownership of shallow 
tube wells and pump sets is restricted to farmers 
operating much larger landholdings. In Morang, 
out of the farmers operating more than 3 ha, 
41% own tube wells and 39% own pump sets 
(Figure 5). In Dhanusha, 27% and 30% of these 
large farmers own tube wells and pump sets, 
respectively (Figure 6). In Rupandehi, 33% of 
farmers with more than 3 ha own tube wells, with 
a substantial 58% owning pump sets (Figure 7). 
It is clear that ownership of either tube wells or 
pump sets is extremely low for more marginal 
farmers operat ing less than 0.5 ha in al l 
three districts, and ownership of pump sets is 
negligible.  
There are two primary reasons for marginal 
farmers not being able to bore wells or invest 
in a pump set. First, of course, is raising the 
capital to invest. The costs of boring a well can 
be considerable, and it varies according to the 
underlying geology. In Dhainiya of Morang, it 
costs from USD 180-200 to bore a well (interview 
conducted in Dhainiya); in Kambe of Lumbini VDC 
in Rupandehi, the cost was USD 700-800; and 
a few kilometers away in Mahuwari, it reportedly 
costs up to 1,500 as farmers have to dig beyond 
the clay layers to reach the deeper aquifer. Second, 
an equally significant expense is the purchasing 
of pumping equipment. Diesel pump sets can cost 
between USD 350 and USD 400. Therefore, boring 
a well and then purchasing the pumping equipment 
represents a significant capital investment that is 
only viable for farmers with larger landholdings who 
yield a significant surplus and profit from their land. 
FIGURE 5. Ownership of agricultural equipment by farm size category in Morang.
Data source: NSCA (2001).
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FIGURE 6. Ownership of agricultural equipment by farm size category in Dhanusha.
Data source: NSCA (2001).
FIGURE 7. Ownership of shallow tube wells and pump sets by farm size category in Rupandehi.
Data source: NSCA (2001).
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While the relationship between farm size 
and ownership of pump sets or tube wells is to 
be expected, more complex constraints rooted 
in the relations of production impede marginal 
farmers who are tenants from investing in such 
technologies. As one would expect, high rent 
payments mean that there is limited surplus 
produce which can be converted into cash to 
meet the necessary fixed costs. However, with 
regards to tube wells, in particular, tenants have 
few incentives to bore wells on land that does 
not belong to them, an issue which was brought 
up in nearly all interviews and focus group 
discussions. In Madhuri in Rupandehi, a village 
with high levels of tenancy, it was reported that 
only 15 have bored a well out of approximately 
80 households. Any f ixed investment is a 
considerable risk for tenants as they could be 
evicted from the land at any time. The 2013 
survey carried out in two VDCs in Dhanusha 
and three VDCs in Morang produced similar 
results. Of the owner cultivators with more 
than 3 bighas (2 ha) of land, 19% own pump 
sets and wells, with only 12% owning wells. In 
contrast, only 5% of small owner cultivators with 
less than 1 bigha (0.67 ha), 9% of part-tenants 
and no pure tenants own either wells or pumps. 
In Morang, none of the tenants or part tenants 
and just 6% of owner cultivators had pump sets 
or wells (survey carried out by the author in 
2013). 
Dur ing  a  g roup d iscuss ion  in  S i tpur 
of Bhaudaha VDC in Morang, a Rajbanshi 
farmer who operated 3 bighas (2 ha) on a 
sharecropping (adhiya or bataiya) contract 
explained how 2 bighas (1.34 ha) of his land 
received a little water from a canal. Although 
he could potentially bore a tube well for a more 
reliable water supply, it was too big a risk to 
take as the landlord could cancel the tenancy 
given the oral nature of the contract. Although 
some tenant farmers who owned a well were 
encountered, all these farmers had at least a 
small plot of their own land where the well could 
be dug. However, even if a farmer owned a 
small plot where a well is a safe investment, one 
may not be able to irrigate rented plots using the 
same source if they are located far away. 
This reluctance to bore wells is aggravated 
by the fact that most households that rent land 
do not have tenancy or mohi rights (Sugden and 
Gurung 2012). These are formal government-
approved contracts for tenants to cultivate the 
land for a stipulated period. Landlords are, 
however, reluctant to provide these papers as 
government legislation in the past has allowed 
tenants to claim half of the land after farming it 
for a prescribed period of time (Adhikari 2006). 
Informal oral contracts mean that it is very hard 
for tenants to make legal claims to the land 
they farm. This parallels the study by Shah et 
al. (2009) across India, where government land 
regulations have simply led to a predominance 
of oral contracts, paradoxically undermining the 
rights of the farmers which these laws seek to 
protect.
In Bhaudaha and Sisabani Jahada VDCs 
in Morang, it was estimated that only 10% to 
15% of households have tenancy rights. In the 
remote village of Hurhuriya in Thalaha VDC, 
this was estimated to be as low as 5%. Similar 
findings were evident across the studied villages 
in Dhanusha. In a focus group discussion held 
in Madhuri village in Rupandehi, it was reported 
that only one household in the community had 
an official tenancy contract; it was also apparent 
that some landlords in Birini to the east make a 
conscious decision to change tenants regularly. 
In this way, the tenants are less likely to claim 
any rights to the land. This, of course, acts as 
a further disincentive for farmers to invest in 
irrigation.  
Interestingly, two different respondents from 
Dhanusha and Morang reported that, while 
landlords were more willing to give tenancy 
rights in the past, they have become more 
wary about this over the last 10-15 years. 
Farmers are more aware of their rights today, 
and landlords are afraid that tenants will be 
more vocal in making claims to half of the land 
they farm within a few years as per the legal 
provisions, if they can provide receipts of rent 
payments. Landlords’ fears are worsened at 
a time when there is increased discussion in 
Kathmandu about a new round of land reforms 
(Sugden and Gurung 2012).  
15
In this context, a number of tenants stated 
that they would only bore a well if the landlord 
takes the initiative to do this themselves. This 
begs the question of the likelihood of a landlord 
making such an investment. This may be 
possible in the case of locally-based landlords. 
For example, some large farmers have rented 
out land that they had previously cultivated 
themselves, and this is increasing as they seek 
to transfer the risk involved in the context of 
poor yields. In such contexts, tenants can benefit 
from any investments the landlords had made in 
the past, including the boring of tube wells. Not 
all local farmers who rent out land are well off; 
some are only medium cultivators who do this 
due to labor shortages, which often occurs due 
to the migration of family members. It is usually 
in their interests to increase production, so that 
they can retain a greater share of the produce 
(or increase rents in the case of fixed-rate 
contracts).
However, the incentives for the absentee 
landlords of Morang and Rupandehi to invest 
on the land are very l imited. At present, 
land is not the primary source of income for 
both traditional and ‘new’ absentee landlord 
c lasses.  The ‘occupat ions ’  o f  absentee 
landlords listed in focus group discussions 
included high-level jobs in the bureaucracy, 
along the domain of landed classes. Some 
also had roles in the private sector, including 
Box 1. Case study 1. Elite capture of land in tube well user groups.
Hari Sardar (pseudonym) from Bishnupur in Morang recalled that during his grandfather’s time most of the 
indigenous Bantar community in the village had a plot of land which was sufficient to meet their subsistence 
needs. However, most households had lost their land due to indebtedness and deception, and were working 
as laborers and tenants at present. Hari lost his land to a powerful family from Biratnagar in the 1960s, after 
his father was cheated over the value of a loan. This same landlord took a lead in establishing a well through 
a government scheme which was supposed to be for the benefit of a group of local farmers – a so-called user 
group. However, once the well was built, the landlord took control of it and now uses it for his own purposes, 
mostly to irrigate 10 bighas of his land which is rented out to his own tenants. No other farmers, including 
tenants from other plots, are allowed to use it. Hari Sardar lamented that a lot of money comes in the name of 
Dalit empowerment, yet it is all siphoned away by the elites.
employment in banks or ownership of businesses, 
particularly in the travel and hospitality sector10. 
For such households, land is simply an additional 
source of income (or used for producing grain for 
home consumption) while also being retained for 
the social status associated with landownership, 
and the speculative value of the holdings (Sugden 
and Gurung 2012). It was reported that, in this 
context, landlords have little interest in agriculture. 
Although some may have cultivated the land 
themselves in past generations, this was long 
before the expansion of the conventional shallow 
tube well technology, and thus tenants rarely 
benefit from investments made in the past.
In Madhuri of Rupandehi, a focus group 
discussion revealed that, out of 20 different 
absentee landlords, only three had taken the 
initiative to bore a well. Similarly, out of the 
farmers interviewed in Morang District, the author 
encountered only one instance of landlords 
boring a well for their tenants, and this was 
through the corrupt capture of benefits from a 
government scheme as shown in case study 1 
(see Box 1). Farmers cultivating the estates of 
absentee landlords in Morang usually meet their 
landlords only once a year when they come to 
collect the rent. Often, in the case of fixed-rate 
thekka contracts, the landlord does not even 
visit the land, and the farmers have to take the 
grain produced to the kantha or grain merchant 
where the paddy will be measured and rent paid. 
10 Interestingly, there were no reports of landlords being involved in productive sectors such as manufacturing.
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Farmers joked that some wealthy landlords visit 
their land very rarely, and their estates are so 
large that even they do not know which plot of 
land is theirs. In this context, the potential for 
landlords to contribute to the costs of boring 
wells seems overly optimistic, and their attitude 
is often indifferent as shown in case study 2 
(Box 2). 
An alternative for tenants who cannot bore a 
well would be to purchase a pump set to extract 
water from wells belonging to other farmers. 
Again, however, given the high rent payments, 
the costs are prohibitive. Furthermore, without 
a reliable source of water they have control 
over, such an investment is risky. The priority 
for most households is to acquire a well (unless 
other water sources, such as a perennial river, 
are available) and only consider investment in 
pumping equipment. In Madhuri of Rupandehi, the 
focus group estimated that only 20 households 
engaged in tenancy owned a pump set, and this 
belonged mostly to those who have at least some 
land of their own. In fact, many marginal farmers 
with their own water source still have to rent 
pumps – a topic which will be discussed in the 
next section. A Rajbanshi farmer from Sitpur had 
invested USD 85 to dig a well on the 1.2 bighas 
of land he owned (0.8 ha). This well also irrigates 
4 bighas (2.7 ha) of additional land his household 
has rented out. However, the pump, which would 
be a far more significant expense, is rented from 
a neighbor.  
The Groundwater and Equipment Rental 
Market
While it is clear that ownership of tube wells is 
highly skewed, a question which remains is the 
other methods through which marginal and tenant 
farmers can access groundwater. Groundwater 
markets, whereby farmers rent tube wells or 
equipment, are argued to facilitate access to water 
for marginal farmers (Pant 2004; Singh 2007). 
Those who cannot bore their own tube well can 
purchase water from their wealthier counterparts, 
while those who own a well but no pump set can 
rent equipment. However, how efficiently do these 
markets operate, and how easy is it for marginal 
and tenant farmers to access them?
When deciding whether or not to rent a well 
and equipment, the potential for increased yields 
is often balanced out against the considerable 
expense and risk it entails. The expense is not 
so much in the well but in the equipment required 
to extract water. For example, the rental fee for a 
well is often marginal at just USD 0.05 per hour, 
while the rental fee for the pump set, including 
diesel, can be high and ranges from USD 2 to 
USD 4 per hour. Meanwhile, the rental of pumping 
equipment (not the well) is often the primary 
source of revenue for richer tube well owners. 
Under these arrangements, the well and pumping 
equipment are often rented out as a ‘package’, 
given that most marginal farmers own neither 
wells nor pump sets. In fact, in some villages, if a 
Box 2. Case study 2. Indifference of absentee landlords.
Most of the indigenous Bantar community in Bhaudaha, Morang, are landless tenants, who lost their holdings 
to the feudal elite during the Rana times or to urban dwellers more recently. The majority of landlords are 
absentee, preferring fixed-rent thekka contracts where a prescribed payment of grain is received, as this 
requires limited supervision or time spent travelling to villages to monitor the harvest. However, this also 
means that investment in a well is not going to affect what they receive as rent, which would be the case for 
sharecropping contracts, and this means that landlords have few incentives to encourage investment. Rajesh 
Sardar (pseudonym) rents 2 bighas of land on a thekka contract from a landlord living in Biratnagar City. 
He recently asked the landlord for assistance to raise capital to buy a pump set and dig a well to improve 
productivity. The landlord was dismissive, stating that it was the farmer’s responsibility to manage a pump or 
well if they required one, and that they should leave the land if they were unhappy so that it could be rented 
out to someone else. 
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farmer has a good relationship with a well owner, 
they will not be charged for the water as long as 
the latter’s pumping equipment is used.  
The groundwater and equipment rental costs, 
however, vary considerably from village to village, 
and this acts as a considerable constraint for 
marginal farmers. Table 3 provides a list of rental 
fees reported by selected farmers who were 
asked about their most recent crop. It shows 
that there is considerable variation in the cost of 
renting a tube well and pump set, even within a 
single VDC. A more detailed study is necessary 
to understand the pricing system. At least, 
provisionally, it appears that the cost depends 
on a number of factors, which are primarily 
rooted in power relations. If a farmer does not 
have their own tube well, the bargaining power 
for renting equipment is inevitably reduced. This 
is further reduced when groundwater use is not 
well developed in a locality, and there are few 
choices of wells to rent that are situated close to 
a farmer’s field. 
In southeastern Dhanusha, it was reported that 
negotiating the expense of the pump set (which 
is often owned by the same farmer who owns 
the well) can be challenging, particularly if the 
demand is high. In these contexts, pump owners 
can charge what the market will bear. According 
to Mukherji (2007), in the context of West Bengal, 
it is noted that prohibitively high investment costs 
in wells and equipment generate the conditions 
for rent-seeking, as only a few can afford the 
investment. As has been argued in the literature 
elsewhere on the eastern Indo-Gangetic Plains, 
rental of equipment or tube wells is by no means 
governed by the free hand of the market, and 
local monopolies can take shape (Bhandari and 
Pandey 2006), with rental of equipment being used 
to reproduce the power and surplus appropriation 
capacity of the landed classes (Wilson 2002). 
Another reason costs vary relates to locally-
specific factors such as the remoteness of 
villages. In Singya Madan, a remote VDC in 
eastern Dhanusha, it costs up to USD 3.1 per 
TABLE 3. Rental costs per hour for a tube well with a diesel pump set, as identified from selected respondents that 
participated in qualitative interviews.
No. VDC District Rental cost per hour (USD) Owner of well 
1 Bhaudaha Morang 1.6 Other farmer
2 Bhaudaha Morang 1.3 User group
3 Bhaudaha Morang 2.1 Other farmer
4 Sisabani Jahada Morang 2.1 User group
5 Amgachhi Morang 1.6 User group
6 Dhabouli Dhanusha 1.1 Other farmer
7 Phulgama Dhanusha 2.1 Other farmer
8 Singhyahi Madan Dhanusha 3.2 Other farmer
9 Bangaha Mahottari 2.1 Other farmer
10 Thadi Jijha (Thadi village) Dhanusha 3.2 Other farmer
11 Thadi Jijha (Jijha village) Dhanusha 4.2 Other farmer
12 Basantpur Rupandehi 2.6 Other farmer
13 Lumbini Rupandehi 2.1 User group
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hour to rent a well. Pump owners claimed this 
was because it was difficult to reach Janakpur 
City, especially in the wet season, and fuel costs 
are thus high due to the transportation difficulties. 
However, such claims could also be used by 
equipment owners to mask their monopoly pricing, 
given that there were few choices of wells or 
pumps to rent. Some farmers in similarly remote 
villages nearby appeared to be paying a lot less. 
Electric pump sets are a lot cheaper to use, and 
are lighter and more portable. However, due 
to frequent power cuts11, they were not always 
effective and some areas are still not connected 
to the electric grid, which is a challenge across 
the Tarai-Madhesh (Kansakar 2006).  
In the context of these high costs, field-
level data suggested that tenant farmers 
have a reduced capacity to rent wells and 
equipment when compared to their owner 
cultivator counterparts – in the same way that 
they are reluctant to actually invest in such 
assets. In Morang, only 31% of tenants or part 
tenants had rented a pump set and tube well. In 
Dhanusha, this is higher, at 74%, yet the area 
of land irrigated and quantities of water used 
are likely to have been significantly lower. The 
survey, for example, showed that only 30% of 
the total land area belonging to tenants or part-
tenants in Dhanusha was under groundwater 
irrigation over the last year at any one stage of 
production (see Table 4). In contrast, 60% of 
the land belonging to owner cultivators with an 
area between 0.5 and 2 ha, and 34% of those 
with more than 2 ha was under groundwater 
irrigation12. Similarly, only 9% of tenants or part 
tenants had cultivated wheat, which is entirely 
dependent on irrigation, as opposed to 25% of 
owner cultivators with less than 1 bigha, and 
33% of large owner cultivators with more than 
3 bighas (2 ha). 
I t  i s  c lear  f rom the  above da ta  tha t 
groundwater use is more limited amongst tenant 
farmers. Furthermore, when the groundwater 
market is monopolistic, paying high fees to 
rent wells and equipment can reinforce local-
level semi-feudal relations between tenants 
and a large farmer minority. This is particularly 
pertinent in Dhanusha and western Rupandehi 
where the primary landlord-tenant relations 
are between high and middle caste local 
landlords and rich farmers, and a lower caste 
marginal farmer and tenant class. The large 
farmers’ class power is reproduced not only 
through ownership of land, but through control 
over pumping equipment and water sources. 
As noted above, in the context of declining 
harvests and high costs of production, some 
large farmers had actual ly ceased direct 
production and had instead rented out much 
of their land, while also investing in agricultural 
machinery solely to rent out land to others. 
After a fixed one-off investment, renting the 
TABLE 4. Groundwater use by marginal farmers in the survey carried out in Thadhi Jijha and Ekrahi VDCs in Dhanusha.
Farm category Total area of land under  Percentage of cultivated land Percentage of households 
 groundwater irrigation (ha) area under groundwater irrigation cultivating wheat in the last  
   year 
Tenant/part-tenant 9.8 30 9
Owner cultivator with < 0.5 ha 2.8 35 25
Owner cultivator with 0.5-2 ha 15.01 60 17
Owner cultivator with > 2 ha 9.88 34 33
11 At the time the research was conducted, dry-season power cuts due to an energy crisis in Nepal were as high as 14 hours a day, increasing 
to 16 hours during some weeks.
12 The apparently lower levels of overall  groundwater use amongst the larger farmers of Dhanusha may be due to the fact that they will only 
irrigate a portion of their bigger farms, and also because they are more likely to have land with access to other forms of irrigation, such as 
canals.
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pump offers an additional source of revenue 
alongside the share of the harvest provided by 
their tenants, while requiring no personal effort.
In the context of the constraints outlined 
above, some tenant farmers prefer to leave the 
land fallow during the dry season rather than 
investing in groundwater use. Instead, they 
engage in menial off-farm labor until the next 
monsoon (Box 3, Case study 3). The risks are 
worsened by the escalating costs of diesel which 
is necessary to pump water, and the increasingly 
erratic climate. For example, unseasonal heavy 
rains during the months of April and May of 2012 
had ruined more than half of the wheat crop in 
some parts of Morang. In such contexts, tenant 
households appear to weigh up the risks of 
achieving a poor harvest and making a loss on 
their investment in both labor and inputs, on the 
one hand, and not being able to find work in the 
non-farm sector, on the other. It was reported 
by a number of tenants in Morang that the ideal 
solution was to combine tenant farming with non-
farm employment. In other words, they work on 
their land up to a certain point, beyond which they 
prefer to provide labor to the non-farm sector, 
ideally in factories where the employment is most 
regular (see Sugden 2013).  
It is worth noting that the likelihood of 
tenants allocating their resources in the non-
farm sector during the dry season instead 
of irrigated agriculture is increased for those 
renting land on sharecropping contracts. The 
2007-2008 study from Morang, covered in 
Sugden and Gurung (2012), has shown how 
sharecroppers, in particular, have considerably 
reduced incentives to invest in technologies 
that improve productivity, given that the landlord 
will retain half the amount for each unit of 
investment. However, for fixed-rent tenants, such 
as those renting land through the thekka system 
(and owner cultivators), the entire incremental 
product accrued from enhanced allocation of 
technologies, such as irrigation and labor, will 
be retained by the tiller. In this context, thekka 
farmers were more likely to pay to access 
groundwater to cultivate a dry-season crop of 
wheat or summer rice (Sugden and Gurung 
2012).
The reduced incentives for sharecroppers to 
invest in the groundwater market can, however, 
be reduced if landlords contribute to the costs 
involved. Newbery (1975) suggested that 
encouraging innovation by sharecropping tenants 
is in the interest of the landlords, as they are able 
to make a profit from the increased revenue. It 
was, however, reported by sharecroppers during 
interviews conducted that, while landlords usually 
contribute to the costs of fertilizer and seeds, 
they rarely contribute to the costs of irrigation. 
Nevertheless, it was claimed that, if the land is 
very fertile, tenants can bargain with the landlords 
so that they will make some contribution towards 
the cost of irrigation as well as fertilizer. In Singya 
Madan village of Dhanusha, sharecropping 
farmers renting land from local landlords did, 
in some instances, receive half the money for 
irrigation as well as for fertilizer and seeds (see 
Box 3, Case study 3), which made the cultivation 
of a dry-season crop more attractive. However, 
in this village, most of the landlords were local, 
so it was in their interest to encourage improved 
productivity. As noted above, not all the farmers 
renting out land are well off, and some of the 
lessees in Singya Madan were female-headed 
households whose male family members had 
migrated. In these contexts, it is understandable 
that landlords would want to invest to increase 
their share of the harvest.
However, in the case of Morang, the 2007-
2008 survey revealed no evidence of absentee 
landlords contributing to the costs of irrigation. 
Three-quarters of the landlords were absentee 
and were themselves quite wealthy, with limited 
interest in the hassles and risks of supervising 
investments on their own farms. Even farmers on 
sharecropping contracts were, in all instances, 
expected to pay for the use of tube well irrigation. 
This, again, reminds one that the nature of the 
landlord-tenant relationship affects the efforts to 
develop shallow tube well irrigation.
Another disincentive for poorer households to 
rent tube wells and equipment, which is relevant 
to tenants and small owner cultivators alike, 
relates to the amount of water they will receive. 
The study by Bhandari and Pandey (2006) from 
the Nepal Tarai noted that groundwater ‘buyers’ 
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often receive irrigation water from a well only 
after the owner has irrigated his or her land. The 
tube well owner has greater control over where 
they can irrigate their land, and thus can benefit 
from a greater quality and quantity of irrigation 
water, unlike their counterparts who rent wells. 
The study based on data from Sarlahi and Banke 
shows that the average yield of shallow tube well 
owners was 25% higher than those who rent 
wells, and 86% higher than rainfed farmers. The 
net benefit was calculated to be USD 50 higher 
for tube well owners when compared to water 
purchasers. Similarly, in the study by Mukherji 
(2007) from West Bengal, it was noted that there 
were large differences in productivity between 
water buyers and water sellers, and kinship ties 
were a perquisite to buying water when wells are 
owned and operated by an extended family group.
Also, in Madhuri vil lage of Rupandehi, 
respondents noted how the water is often not 
available when required, if they are renting using 
a water source belonging to another farmer. The 
well owners will prioritize their own lands first if 
the demand for water is high, for example, during 
a drought. There is also competition sometimes 
from more than one renting farmer, and whether 
one can rent a well or access water in a timely 
manner often depends on the relationship one has 
with the well owner. Without such a relationship 
one may have to wait until other farmers have 
had their turn before they can use the well. 
These relationships also affect the cost. While 
some farmers would rent out pump sets but give 
the well free, at other times they would expect a 
small payment of approximately USD 0.21 per 
hour to use the well on top of what is paid for the 
pumping machinery. This highlights that even if a 
farmer has to rent an expensive pump set, having 
their own tube well will at least ensure they have 
access to sufficient water in a timely manner.
A final disincentive to renting tube wells or 
equipment is scattered holdings. While it was 
common even for large landowners to own several 
plots in geographically dispersed locations, the 
problem appeared particularly acute for tenants 
who must often rent several very small plots from 
several landlords in order to meet their subsistence 
needs. One Dalit farmer in Singya Madan of 
Dhanusha noted how he owns 2 katha in one 
location, then rents separate plots of 1.5 katha from 
a farmer from the Mallah caste, 18 katha from a 
Mahato farmer, and another 4 katha from a Thakur 
family. All the plots are spread across different 
locations, so he cannot easily irrigate the land, with 
the exception of a field by a river where a pump is 
rented for USD 2.1 per hour. 
Groundwater markets have been argued 
to address the problem of lack of consolidated 
holdings, as it can allow a farmer to rent multiple 
water sources belonging to different farmers (Pant 
2004). However, this is dependent upon there 
being a well-developed groundwater sector, with 
a sufficient spread of tube wells to cover each plot 
of land. In villages where groundwater extraction 
Box 3. Case study 3. Managing costs of wells and equipment in Dhanusha.
Singhya Madan VDC is located in a remote corner of Dhanusha District on the edge of the Kamala River. 
There were large floods in the village in 2003, and large tracts of land were inundated. Today, farmers 
perceived that the rice harvest is poor due to the high amount of course sediment deposited in the soil, 
although the yields for wheat are better. It was estimated that nearly three-quarters of the Dalit Pashwan 
community had no agricultural land, and many work as tenants for local farmers with excess holdings, with 
additional income from migrant remittances or menial wage labor. They reported that to harvest wheat they 
would need to pay at least USD 6.3 for each katha (0.034 ha) of land to rent a tube well and pump set. 
Many households are heavily indebted already, having taken loans to send family members abroad. The cost 
of renting a well and equipment was considered too high for many of these tenants, and some preferred to 
invest their time and labor working elsewhere, such as in the fields of farmers over the river in Siraha District. 
Occasionally, local landlords would, however, contribute to the cost of irrigation.
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is not well developed, such as Mahuwari, the 
lack of any well in the vicinity of one’s plot is a 
barrier to utilizing the groundwater market. Here, 
the underlying geology has made groundwater 
extraction difficult, and the few wells in the village 
are poorly functioning. Most water is extracted 
from a nearby pond and river using a pump 
set, and this can only irrigate fields located 
close to these sources. Furthermore, even if 
there are wells available, farmers in Dhanusha 
complained that the heavy diesel pump sets 
are not easily transportable. Frequent moving of 
equipment reduces their life span and increases 
maintenance costs. For this reason, pump owners 
are sometimes reluctant to regularly move the 
equipment long distances to the vicinity of a well 
where it is needed.
Collective Use of Groundwater
While it is clear that there are problems with 
the groundwater market, a remaining question 
relates to the utility of user groups in facilitating 
access to groundwater for marginal farmers and 
tenants. Collective ownership and management 
of pump irrigation systems are appropriate when 
small landholdings in the context of high boring 
costs make individual ownership unviable (Shah 
and Bhattacharya 1994). Government-run tube 
wells present a model of collective use which 
has been examined in the context of India. 
Such wells were found to be less viable due 
to bureaucratic constraints and high potential 
for land capture by elite and wealthy farmers. 
However, when infrastructure has been collectively 
run by relatively autonomous user groups, the 
reports from the literature have been generally 
positive (Rao 1995; Shah et al. 1994; Shah and 
Bhattacharya 1994).13
This latter model is by far the most common 
form of collective groundwater use in Nepal 
today, and involves a group of farmers forming 
a committee and pooling resources to install a 
well which is normally installed through various 
government programs. The members then cultivate 
the land according to their needs as before, while 
simply paying a maintenance fee for the well and 
the pump. In many cases, a portion of the cost 
is paid by the government project initiating the 
boring of wells. In the case of the recent Shallow 
Tube Well Irrigation project of the government, the 
GWRDB provided the entire cost of the wells while 
the user group was responsible for acquiring the 
pump. In Bhaudaha village of Morang, for example, 
there were four to five user groups collectively 
owning wells, each with 22-25 people, while 6 
private farmers owned wells. Usually, non-members 
can also use the well on payment of a fee. The 
farmer who uses the well for his land is basically 
responsible to pay whatever it costs to rent the 
pump set. On top of this, they have to give USD 
0.05 to the group to cover for any maintenance 
costs of the well. It irrigates around 4 ha, which 
is the limit for a shallow tube well in the area, 
and benefits a large number of households which 
have very small plots of land of less than 0.3 ha, 
including several tenants. 
Collective use of tube wells represents a 
significant opportunity for marginal and tenant 
farmers who cannot establish wells on their 
own land. Nevertheless, there are a number of 
lingering challenges. To begin, many ‘committees’ 
have a short life span, creating constraints when it 
comes to maintenance of the wells or equipment. 
There are, however, deeper constraints. 
First, while a user group may allow farmers to 
collectively bore a well for free, only some groups 
had pooled their resources to purchase a pump 
set. Often, tenants may be the member of a 
groundwater user group while still having to rent a 
pump from rich farmers at a high price. For most 
marginal tenants, this remains a considerable 
expense, although access to their own well at 
least offers a more reliable source of water and 
can increase their bargaining power with respect 
to the cost of running the pump (they are not 
dependent on using the pump owner’s well).
13 See also MacCarl (2013) for a more detailed discussion on the groundwater user groups in Morang and Dhanusha of Nepal.
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Second, a more significant challenge to 
collective groundwater use lies in the agrarian 
structure itself. Accessing groundwater through 
government initiatives is a particular challenge 
if one does not own land in the area where one 
wants to irrigate, as shown in MacCarl (2013). 
In order to register a user group and apply for 
a well, an organized group of farmers needs 
to establish a committee and travel together to 
the government’s GWRDB regional office. It is, 
however, the responsibility of landlords to group 
together to fill in the paperwork for a set area of 
land. If the tenant has no land of their own, or 
owns land in a different location from the rented 
plot they want to irrigate, they cannot apply 
on their own. With the limited interest of many 
landlords, particularly those who are absentee, 
this is a significant barrier to benefitting from 
these programs. Tenant farmers in Chhipagad 
of Rupandehi, for example, complained that they 
would like to apply for a well, but their urban-
based landlords were not interested.
Third, another challenge relates to the elite 
capture of land by more powerful farmers. The 
study by Shah and Bhattacharya (1994) from 
Gujarat suggested that a possible cause of the 
poor performance of tube well cooperatives was 
that large farmers can create user groups to 
access tube wells at a subsidized rate, which are 
then privatized for personal gain, while retaining 
the veneer of a cooperative. Indeed, one common 
form of manipulation noted in Dhanusha included 
individuals forming ‘fake’ user groups, which 
usually entailed individuals collecting signatures 
from users, and then treating the well as their 
own private property (see Box 3, case study 3). 
In one village, there was anger that a user group 
leader and wealthier farmer had applied to a 
government scheme to bore a well in the name 
of a user group, yet when the well was built, he 
used it mostly for his own needs and other group 
members did not get a fair share of the water. 
There was a perception that there was some kind 
of corrupt nexus between a local micro-finance 
bank and the user group leader. The group had 
collectively contributed around USD 700 for the 
pump set and a maintenance fund in the bank. 
However, it was reported that the maintenance 
fund held in the bank is hardly ever released 
when it is needed, causing them to suspect that 
funds were being siphoned off. 
There was another incident in the same 
village of Dhanusha where a ‘group’ was present, 
but all members came from the same production 
unit. There was a rule in that program that 
there should be a minimum of four members in 
each group for each 4 bighas (2.7 ha) of land. 
However, the father, brothers and wife of a single 
household applied as a ‘group’, so they could get 
a free tube well installed through the government 
scheme. When the well is built, it basically 
belonged to one household and the others had to 
pay a rental fee. There was anger that benefits 
of a recent NGO intervention were also captured 
by the same local elites. When they came to the 
village, some dalals (middlemen) influenced the 
staff in their decisions regarding who to support. 
They ended up providing support to a group of 
influential residents.
In Rupandehi, there were some more indirect 
forms of elite land capture encountered. For each 
ward, there is a ‘quota’ for receiving free boring 
of wells from the GWRDB. In each ward, just 
five wells are provided in each season. Once the 
quota has been filled, the residents must wait for 
the next season until they can be considered for 
any other wells. As a result, there is competition. 
In both Hakui and Birini, it was reported that 
farmers with political influence sometimes get 
priority in applications for a well. 
Fourth, another significant factor that affects 
the poorest households’ capacity to benefit from 
interventions promoting collective groundwater 
use is the selective way in which they are spread 
geographically. It did not appear that government-
led opportunities for subsidized installation of wells 
were widely publicized. In order to register a user 
group and apply for a well, an organized group 
of farmers needs to establish a committee and 
travel together to the GWRDB office in Biratnagar 
(for Morang), Jaleshwor (for Dhanusha) or Butwal 
(for Rupandehi). Even if farmers are aware of 
the program, such a journey is not always an 
easy undertaking, particularly in remote VDCs. 
The time, paperwork and resources consumed 
in applying to form a tube well cooperative was 
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noted as a considerable constraint in the study 
carried out by Shah and Bhattacharya (1994), 
meaning that forming an informal tube well 
‘company’ was a more practical option, even 
though it meant farmers did not receive subsidized 
infrastructure. 
In this context, it appeared that it was 
normally through local connections and social 
networks that user groups would receive support. 
For example, a significant number of the 65 tube 
wells were built in Amgachhi VDC of Morang 
under a government program. It was reportedly 
easier for farmers in the area as an employee 
from the groundwater office is from that VDC. 
Five to seven years ago, the employee informed 
the farmers in advance, so they knew the process 
and user groups had their application ready by 
the time the project started. They even received 
a machine for free. However, in neighboring 
Dhainiya VDC there was no leader to organize 
the farmers. The farmers were discontented that 
they were too late to receive a free pump set, a 
privilege only provided under the earlier programs 
which had now been discontinued.
Similarly, in a Phulgama of Dhanusha, one 
of the local people had contact with a local NGO. 
Through them, they learned of the APP shallow 
tube well program. Two to three people then went 
to Jaleshwor to submit an application. The village 
eventually received NPR 800,000 worth of support 
for 20 user groups. A total of 100 households 
benefitted from the project, which is around 90% 
of households in the village. Only around 10% 
were left out, as their land was beyond the reach 
of the wells. It is worth noting that, in this village, 
almost all households were from the relatively 
better-off Yadav community, and reportedly almost 
all had their own land with holdings of 1 ha or 
above, on average. 
However, villages home to marginal cultivators 
and traditionally excluded communities were often 
inadvertently sidelined. In villages such as Sitpur 
of Bhaudaha in Morang, almost all the farmers 
are marginal sharecroppers from the Rajbanshi 
and Bantar ethnic groups. In such communities, 
access to social networks are more limited, and 
there are fewer well-educated ‘leader farmers’ with 
connections to the bureaucracy and knowledge 
of the latest opportunities. As one would expect, 
there were few groundwater interventions with 
only a few wells in the village, both of which were 
private. A similar example is Singya Madan VDC 
of Dhanusha. Most households are sharecroppers 
or very small landholders with a large Dalit 
majority. There were reportedly no user groups 
in the villages which were visited, and only a few 
richer farmers had pump sets or wells and rented 
them out. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
In light of the challenges stated in this report, 
it is clear that the constraints to developing the 
productive forces of agriculture through shallow 
tube well irrigation are deeply entrenched in the 
agrarian structure. In particular, landlord-tenant 
relations undermine the capacity of tenants 
to invest in a well or pump set. At the same 
time, the marginal economic status of tenants 
makes renting equipment and wells prohibitively 
expensive, particularly when pump rental is used 
by rich farmers to enhance their own economic 
status. Collective ownership of wells offers some 
opportunities, yet the inability for landless tenants 
to register groups, elite land capture in the context 
of a stratified society and limited knowledge of 
programs limit the success of initiatives.
In the long term, radical land reforms are 
the only solution which can potentially facilitate 
sustained groundwater-led growth in agricultural 
productivity, including a strict regulation of ceilings 
and control of absentee landlordism. Even mid-
way solutions, such as tenancy law reforms, may 
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not be a solution as warned by Shah et al. (2009), 
as it may give landlords a greater incentive 
to conceal and informalize contracts, further 
undermining the rights of tenants. However, any 
redistributive reform appears extremely unlikely 
in the current political climate, whereby landlords 
are themselves well embedded within Nepal’s 
political and bureaucratic apparatus (Alden-Wily 
et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, land reform itself may strengthen 
livelihoods initially, but natural differentiation 
between richer and poorer cultivators may well 
increase inequality again over the longer term, 
particularly when one considers the rising costs 
of production and climate stress which is driving 
‘distress sales’ of land (Sugden et al. 2014). 
The demand for tenancy will, therefore, remain 
unless there is a radical transformation of the 
Nepalese economy, which will draw marginal 
farmers out of agriculture (Sugden and Gurung 
2012). The capitalist industrial sector and informal 
urban employment is by no means developed 
well enough for this to occur at present. A 
radical change is unlikely to occur without a 
transformation of Nepal’s economic structure; in 
particular, its dependence upon imports and weak 
position in the regional political economy has 
impeded the organic development of a capitalist 
industry (Blaikie et al. 2001).
There are, however, a number of short-
term solutions which can at least facilitate the 
capacity of marginal and tenant farmers to access 
groundwater. The model of collective tube well 
ownership is promising, although a new approach 
is needed. First, a change is necessary in the 
process for distributing subsidized wells by the 
government, which would allow tenants without 
legal papers to still apply collectively as the tillers 
of the land14. A longer-term solution would be to 
encourage active investment by landlords. While 
this may be possible for local landlords, it appears 
unlikely to happen without eradicating absentee 
landlordism.
S e c o n d ,  g o v e r n m e n t  g r o u n d w a t e r 
development schemes should move from a 
focus of providing subsidized or free tube wells 
alone to an integrated approach, which ensures 
user groups also have access to pumping 
equipment, which is where most of the costs 
lie. Indeed, many collective groundwater use 
schemes reviewed in the literature from India 
have entailed the provision of a combined 
package of a tube well with a fixed pump set 
(Pant 1994; Rao 1995; Shah et al. 1994; Shah 
and Bhattacharya 1994). A new set of programs 
should provide low-cost pump sets and tube 
wells to groups, with appropriate forward linkages 
for users (e.g., supply of parts and maintenance). 
Research is necessary to identify the most 
appropriate low-cost pumping options, including 
solar pumps, although there is a lot of work to 
be done in this sector before these become 
viable on a large scale. Distribution of pump 
sets should be focused explicitly on tenants 
or marginal farmers, and there should be an 
option for groups of tenants to collectively lease 
a pump on its own (not fixed to a tube well). 
This would allow them to extract water from 
other households’ wells (which usually entails 
only a marginal charge) or pump from surface 
water bodies such as ponds. Such pump sets 
would need to be mobile, as it would ensure 
members of the committee would still benefit if 
they are obliged to move to a new plot, not to 
mention the fact that the user groups’ plots may 
be scattered in different locations. Furthermore, 
groups of pump owners must be trained in the 
operation and maintenance of the equipment, 
and appropriate credit arrangements should be 
developed to allow groups to invest their own 
financial resources in the joint investment, and 
thus feel a sense of ownership.
Third, while it is important to target marginal 
farmers with subsidized equipment or boring of 
wells, it is important to do so in a way which 
promotes collective action. The process of 
14 A database of tenants in a community (formal and informal) could potentially be created by an appropriate local unit of government (e.g., 
VDC) or by groundwater project staff to ensure there is no misuse of the system (e.g., creation of fake user groups by private individuals).
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applying for government support by a user 
group must be simplified, and some degree 
of capital investment in proportion to one’s 
share in the company, determined by level of 
use (i.e., operated holding) may increase the 
effectiveness of committees. The findings of Shah 
and Bhattacharya (1994) on tube well ‘companies’ 
in Gujarat suggest that this gives members of 
user groups a greater sense of ‘ownership’ and 
an incentive to maximize use of the equipment. 
There should also be a system in place which 
allows tenants to recover some of their investment 
by selling and transferring their ‘share’ in the user 
group to others, should they be obliged to give up 
their tenancy. 
Furthermore, and on a related note, the 
appointment of a tube well or pump set ‘operator’ 
within each user committee could ensure that the 
equipment and/or tube well is maintained, and 
that water is distributed fairly. So long as they 
are carefully appointed, this would reduce the 
likelihood of elite capture whereby user group 
leaders give themselves priority. In the study by 
Pant (1994) from Uttar Pradesh, this role was 
taken up by the committee secretary. The study 
by Rao (1995) of Panchayat Samiti-run tube wells 
in West Bengal demonstrates how an appointed 
‘operator’ receives a small commission for their 
work, and are responsible for allocating water, 
maintaining bills, collecting pumping charges 
according to use and supplying water to non-
members if surplus is available. It was suggested 
that such operators could even be employed to 
look after several tube wells, if employing one for 
a single committee is not viable.
G r o u n d w a t e r  a c c e s s  w i l l  r e m a i n  a 
considerable challenge in the deeply stratified 
social formation of the eastern Tarai in the years 
to come. It is critical for scholars to continue to 
engage with both short-term solutions which lie in 
the format of groundwater programs themselves, 
including the development of appropriate and 
sustainable technologies, and institutional 
arrangements which are appropriate to the needs 
of marginal and tenant farmers. It is also critical, 
however, not to lose site of the longer-term 
solutions, addressing the social structures which 
create these access barriers in the first place.
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